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EDITORIAL COMMENT

satisfaction of knowing that their labors will serve as a foundation for any
committee which the Council appoints. Accordingly, what at first seemed
to be a task of Sisyphus now promises to be marked off by metes and bounds
and made directly purposeful.
President Coolidge, in his annual message to Congress, on December 4,
1924, while not mentioning the action of the Assembly of the League eo
nomine, referred with approval to the "efforts which are being made toward
the codification of international law." Truly the present seems to be a
period of confidence in unofficial rather than governmental initiative;
therefore the President looks forward more hopefully in the first instance
"to a co6peration among representatives of the bar and members of international law institutes and societies," leaving to governments the approval
of the projects when sufficiently developed.
ARTHUR K. KuruIN.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL QUESTIONS IN THE NATIONAL COURTS

Much has been made of the principle, in England and America, that
international law is part of the national law to be applied by national courts
in appropriate circumstances. As Mr. Justice Gray has expressed it, in the
PaqueteHabana:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often
as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.'
The principle is useful, where it is applicable, but it is subject to limitations
which are sometimes inadequately appreciated. Indeed it is not often that
"questions of right" depending upon international law, as distinguished from
questions of jurisdiction, are really presented in the national courts. Such
questions are more likely to fall within the exclusive competence of the
so-called political departments of government.
There is at the outset a primary limitation upon the principle which is
expressed in the extremely potent proposition that courts must always
yield to the law-making authority. If the law-making department has
spoken in terms free from ambiguity, the courts must apply the rule laid
down whether it violates international law or not. Demonstrating the
point with an impossible but poignant case, Stephen has declared that:
If Parliament were to pass an act to the effect that the whole criminal
law of England should apply to the conduct of Frenchmen in France,
1175 U. S. 677, 700. See Triquet v. Bath, 3 Burr. 1478; Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1
Dali. 111; Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113, 163; West Rand Mining Co. v. The King, [1905]
2 K. B. 391; Picciotto, Relation of InternationalLawto the Law of England and of the United

States.
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and that the Central Criminal Court should have jurisdiction over all
offences against that law committed in France; and if a Frenchman who
had murdered another Frenchman in Paris were brought for trial before
the court, the court would try him as it would try an Englishman who
had committed a murder in London,
2 but the result might probably be
war between France and England.
Courts reconcile legislative enactments and international law wherever it is
reasonably possible to do so, but in the event of conflict there is no choice.
The statutes are paramount.
A second limitation upon the priciple, intimately related to the first, has
been described as the doctrine of political questions.3 Many, if not most, of
the international questions which arise in litigation are regarded as political
in nature and hence not within the competence of the judicial department
at all.
It hardly requires illustration to establish that most questions arising out
of or involving a rupture of diplomatic relations 4 and all questions of peace
or war 5 are preeminently for the political departments to decide.
The judiciary, under the constitution, cannot declare war or make
peace .
.
. The condition of peace or war, public or civil, in a legal
sense, must be determined by the political department, not the judicial.
The latter is bound by the decision thus made.6
When war shall be declared, how it shall be conducted, and when it shall be
brought to an end are matters exclusively within the competence of those
charged with the conduct of international relations. As was observed by one
of the highest British tribunals, in the case of the Zamora, "Those who are
responsible for the national security must be the sole judges of what the
national security requires." 7
Familiar illustrations remind us that many important peace-time questions are excluded from judicial competence by the same effective doctrine.
If the political departments of government dispute a boundary with a.
foreign nation, the courts must bring their decisions into harmony with the
2

History of the Criminal Law of England, Vol. II, pp. 37.

See Beale, "Jurisdiction of

Courts over Foreigners," 26 HarvardLaw Review, 193, 194. See also Mortensen v. Peters, 8'
Sess. Cas. 93; United States v. Siem, 299 Fed. 582, 583.
3See Field, "The Doctrine of Political Questions in Federal Courts," 8 Minnesota Law

Review, 485.
4 Seethe Gul Djemal, 296 Fed. 563.

See also the cases involving international recognition,,

discussed infra.

5 See United States v. Anderson, 9 Wall. 56; the Protector,12 Wall. 700; the Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U. S. 581, 603; Hamilton v. McClaughry, 136 Fed. 445, 449; In re Wulzen,,
235 Fed. 362,365; United States v. Oglesby Grocery Co., 264 Fed. 691, 692. See also United
States v. Yorba, 1 Wall. 412; Hornsby v. United States, 10 Wall. 224; More v. Steinbach,.
127 U. S. 70.
6United States v. One Hundred and Twenty-Nine Packages, Fed. Cas. No. 15,941,p.,288_
7[1916] 2 A. C. 77, 107.
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position thus asserted.8 In the famous case of Foster v. Neilson, Chief
Justice Marshall declared:
In a controversy between two nations concerning national boundary,
it is scarcely possible that the courts of either should refuse to abide by
the measures adopted by its own government. There being no common
tribunal to decide between them, each determines for itself on its own
rights, and if they cannot adjust their differences peaceably, the right
remains with the strongest. The judiciary is not that department of the
government, to which the assertion of its interests against foreign powers
is confided; and its duty commonly is to decide upon individual rights,
according to those principles which the political departments of the
nation have established. 9
After reviewing executive proclamations and legislative acts asserting title to
the territory in dispute, Chief Justice Marshall continued:
After these acts of sovereign power over the territory in dispute, asserting the American construction of the treaty by which the government claims it, to maintain the opposite construction in its own courts
would certainly be an anomaly in the history and practice of nations.
If those departments which are entrusted with.the foreign intercourse of
the nation, which assert and maintain its interests against foreign powers, have unequivocally asserted its rights of dominion over a country of
which it is in possession, and which it claims under a treaty; if the legislature has acted on the construction thus asserted, it is not in its own
courts that the construction is to be denied. A question like this respecting the boundaries of nations, is, as has been truly said, more a
political than a legal question and in its discussion, the courts of every
country must respect the pronounced will of the legislature. 10
1f the political departments assert jurisdiction over any territory, the
courts are concluded by the action taken. Thus when the authority of the
United States over Navassa Island was challenged, in Jones v. United States,
the Supreme Court replied:
Who is the sovereign, de jub or de facto, of a territory is not a judicial,
but a political question, the determination of which by the legislative
and executive departments of any government conclusively binds the
judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of that government."
Equally conclusive are assertions of jurisdiction upon the seas. In one of
several cases arising out of the claim made by the United States to control the
seal fisheries in Behring Sea, a federal court declared:
aSee De la CroLx v. Chamberlain, 12 Wh. 599, 600; Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253; Garcia v.
Lee, 12 Pet. 511.
9 2 Pet. 253, 307.
10 2 Pet. 253, 309.
"137 U. S. 202, 212. See also Watts v. United States, 1 Wash. Terr. 288, 295; Wilson v.
Shaw, 204 U. S. 24, 32.
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National dominion and sovereignty may be extended over the sea as
well as over the land, and in our government, when congress and the
president assert dominion and sovereignty over any portion
of the sea,
12
or over any body of water, the courts are bound by it.
In a recent forfeiture proceeding instituted against a foreign vessel seized
on the high seas for smuggling liquor into the United States, another federal
court has remarked:
The line between territorial waters and the high seas is not like the
boundary between us and a foreign power. There must be, it seems to
me, a certain width of debatable waters adjacent to our coasts. How
far our authority shall be extended into them for the seizure of foreign
vessels which have broken our laws is a matter for the political departments of the government rather than for the courts to determine. 13
In like manner, if the political departments deny the jurisdiction of a
foreign state, the courts must acquiesce and frame their decisions accordingly.
This was done in Williams v. Suffolk Insurance Co., in 1839, after the United
States had denied the authority of Buenos Ayres over the Falkland Islands.
Justice McLean said:
And can there be ny doubt, that when the executive branch of the
government, which is charged with our foreign relations, shall in its
correspondence with a foreign nation assume a fact in regard to the
sovereignty of any island or country, it is conclusive on the judicial
department? And in this view it is not material to inquire, nor is it the
province of the court to determine, whether the executive be right or
wrong. It is enough to know, that in the exercise of his constitutional
functions, he had decided the question. Having done this under the
responsibilities which belong
4 to him, it is obligatory on the people and
government of the Union.
The same reasons which require that the judiciary be guided by the
executive and legislative departments in all international contests over
territorial or maritime jurisdiction, at home or abroad, require also that the
courts defer to the same departments in controversies which turn upon a
question of international recognition. Whether there is a condition of
insurrection in a foreign state, whether the insurgents shall be regarded as
belligerents, whether a successful revolutionary government shall be recognized in the position which it has in fact established, whether a new state
shall be treated as a member of the international community of states,
these are questions which it is exclusively for the political departments of
government to decide. 16 In the comparatively recent case of the Rogdai,

"The Kodiak, 53 Fed. 126, 130. See also the MariannaFlora,11 Wh. 1, 39; In re Cooper,
143 U. S. 472, 499, 502, 503; the James G. Swan, 50 Fed. 108, 110.
"The Grace and the Ruby, 283 Fed. 475, 478.
413 Pet. 415, 420. See also Foster v. Globe Venture Syndicate, 69 L. . Ch. 375, 377.
15See the Three Friends, 166 U. S. 1; United States v. Palmer, 3 Wh. 610; Gelston v. Hoyt,
3 Wh. 246; Dickinson, "The Unrecognized Government or State in English and American
Law," 22 Michigan Law Review, 29, 118.
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an action instituted by the Soviet Republic to secure possession of a Russian
naval transport, the court observed:
The question at issue is one of state; it involves international relations,
and is primarily for the State Department. If, as contended by the
libelants, it be granted that a revolution has taken place in Russia, and
that the Soviet Republic is in actual control, the question when, if at all,
such de facto government shall be recognized, is a political one. It involves considerations of national policy, which are not justiciable, and
touching it the voice of the Chief Executive is the voice, not of a branch
of the government, but of the national sovereignty, equally binding
upon all departments. 6
Many of the most important matters pertaining to the negotiation, observance, and termination of treaties are likewise within the exclusive competence of the political departments. Whether a foreign government is
competent to negotiate, whether it has power to ratify, how the treaty shall
be construed, at least in respect to matters of public right, whether it shall
be treated as terminated upon the succession of another state to the foreign
contracting party, whether it shall be treated as terminated on account of
violations by the other contracting party, whether it shall be observed, suspended, or ended, these again are primarily political questions.17 In Doe v.
Braden, Chief Justice Taney declared that:
It would be impossible for the executive department of the government to conduct our foreign relations with any advantage to the country, and fulfil the duties which the Constitution has imposed upon it, if
every court in the country was authorized to inquire and decide whether
the person who ratified the treaty on behalf of a foreign nation had the
power, by its8 constitution and laws, to make the engagements into which
he entered.1
In Taylor v. Morton, Mr. Justice Curtis said:
Is it a judicial question, whether a treaty with a foreign sovereign has
been violated by him; whether the consideration of a particular stipulation in a treaty, has been voluntarily withdrawn by one party, so that it
16 278 Fed. 294, 296.

For the same reason, questions of diplomatic character are exclu-

sively for the executive to decide. United States v. LAddle, 2 Wash. C. C. 205; United
States v. Ortega, 4 Wash. C. C. 531; United States v. Benner, Baldw. 234; Ez parte Hitz, 111
U. S. 766; In re Baiz, 135 U. S. 403; the Rogday, 279 Fed. 130; Savie v. City of New York,
193 N. Y. Supp. 577.
17 See Doe v. Braden, 16 How. 635. See also United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407,
423-4; I re Taylor, 118 Fed. 196; Johnson v. Browne, 205 U. S. 309, 317; Charlton v. Kelly,
229 U. S. 447, 468. Even in matters affecting private rights, a construction adopted by
the political departments weighs heavily in the courts. Charlton v. Kelly, supra. See
Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U. S. 270, 288; United States v. Jordan, 1 Extraterritorial Cases 259.
See also Ware v. Hylton, 3 Ball. 199, 260; Taylor v. Morton, 2 Curtis 454, 461; Charlton v.
Kelly, supra. And also Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598; the Chinese Exclusion Case,

130 U. S. 581, 602; Techt v. Hughes, 229 N. Y. 222, 242, 243.
1816 How. 635, 657.
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is no longer obligatory on the other; whether the views and acts of a
foreign sovereign, manifested through his representative have given
just occasion to the political departments of our government to withhold the execution of a promise contained in a treaty, or to the act in
direct contravention of such promise? I apprehend not. These
powers have not been confided by the people to the judiciary, which has
no suitable means to exercise them; but to the executive and the legislative departments of our government. They belong to diplomacy and
legislation, and not to the administration of existing laws. 19
Delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court in the Head Money Cases,
Mr. Justice Miller remarked:
A treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations. It
depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the
honor of the governments which are parties to it. If these fail, its infraction becomes the subject of international negotiations and reclamations, so far as the injured party chooses to seek redress, which may in
the end be enforced by actual war. It is obvious that with all this the
judicial courts have nothing to do and can give no redress. 0
Treaties are always subject, of course, so far as the courts may be concerned, to such acts as Congress may subsequently pass for their enforcement,
modification, or repeal.2 '
The admission, exclusion, or expulsion of aliens is also a political power
and controversies with respect to its exercise are beyond judicial competence. In Fong Yue Ting v. United States, it was said:
The power to exclude or to expel aliens, being a power affecting international
relations, is vested in the political departments of the govern22
ment.
In the earlier Chinese Exclusion Case, Mr. Justice Field had remarked:
If the government of the country of which the foreigners excluded are
subjects is dissatisfied with this action it can make complaint to the
executive head of our government, or resort to any other measure
which, in its judgment, its interests or dignity may demand; and there
lies its only remedy.23
It is difficult to conceive of any act of the executive or legislative departments, affecting adversely the interests of a foreign country, which the
courts would feel competent to regard as legally wrong in its international
aspect.24 And, on the other hand, it is well settled that no court will ever
sit in judgment on the acts of a foreign government done within its own
20112 U. S. 580, 598.
19 2 Curtis 454, 461.
21 Taylor v. Morton, 2 Curtis 454; Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580; Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U. S. 190.
22 149 U. S. 698, 713.
23 130 U. S. 581, 606. See also Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651, 659; Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U. S. 585, 591.
24 See O'Reilly v. Brooke, 209 U. S. 45, 52.
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dominion." In the early case of the Invincible, Mr. Justice Story declared
that:
The acts done under the authority of one sovereign can never be subject to the revision of the tribunals of another sovereign; and the parties
2
to such acts are not responsible therefor in their private capacities.
In the more recent case of Earl Line S. S. Co. v. Sutherland S. S. Co.,
Judge Learned Hand has said:
The act of another sovereign within its own territory is of necessity
legal. . . . It is quite true that the act of any public official of a
foreign state may in fact be illegal by the municipal law of that state,
but no domestic court may admit such a 27
possibility without trenching
upon the prerogative of its own executive.
Finally, it is noteworthy that a very large proportion of the controversies
of international import which courts do feel competent to decide are controversies involving only the question of immunity from jurisdiction. Cases
involving the immunities of foreign states, diplomatic representatives,
public ships, and other kinds of public property afford illustrations. In all
such cases the substantial controversy is settled, if at all, through the intervention of the political departments.
No attempt has been made to achieve scientific analysis of the above
cases or even to make the mere enumeration in any sense complete. 28 The
writer hopes merely to have suggested how very limited the judicial function
really is in most cases of international significance. The principle that
international law forms part of the national law achieves little in the way
of subjecting international controversies to the processes of judicial settlement. The obvious propriety of subjecting many of the controversies
reviewed to settlement by judicial procedure indicates that there is a vast
field, but slightly tilled, in which international judicial settlement may be
developed. In the meantime it should be emphasized-it cannot be emphasized too often-that in all matters of international import the political
departments of government, legislative and executive, are not only vigilant
advocates for the nation which they represent. They are also responsible
instrumentalities in the ultimate process by which international justice is
achieved.
EDWIN D. DIcKINsoN.
25 The Invincible, 2 Gall. 29; Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250; Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297; Pdcaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U. S. 304; Hewitt v. Speyer,
250 Fed. 367; Earl Line S. S. Co. v. Sutherland S. S. Co., 254 Fed. 126; the Adriatic,258 Fed.
902. See also American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347.

26 2 Gall. 29, 44.
27 254 Fed. 126, 129.
28 For more systematic analysis and the citation of additional cases, see Field, "The

Doctrine of Political Questions in Federal Courts," cited supra. See also Corwin, President's Control of Foreign Relations; Wright, ,nforcement of International Law through
MunicipalLaw in the United States, pp. 17, 19, 25, 28, 29, 44, 48, 84, 86, 92, 101, 106, 143,
201, 218, and passim; Wright, Control of American Foreign Relations, pp. 1, 47, 75, 107,
143, 191, 247, 251, and passim.

